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 This paper analyses from January 1, 1876 to the end of 1913 the factors which 
influenced the Reichsbank’s liquidity ratio, defined as the ratio of its gold and silver holdings 
to its banknotes outstanding. January 1, 1876 is the day the Reichsbank started operations.  A 
key aspect of the gold standard, as this period came to be called, was the legal obligation on 
the part of Central Banks to convert on request banknotes into gold. From this obligation 
resulted the “discipline” imposed on governments and Central Banks at the time. The 
minimum gold cover of notes outstanding was established by law and varied from country to 
country. As Central Banks could not let the gold cover of notes issued fall below the legally 
established minimum, it is clear that the ratio of gold to notes was constantly monitored, 
leading to apprehension when they were falling rapidly and or approaching the legal 
minimum and to a relaxed attitude when they were increasing.  
 The Central Banks had a very powerful instrument at their disposal to stop the ratio 
from falling and invert its decline. This instrument was the discount rate, which was the 
interest rate they applied on their lending to commercial banks and to the public2. An increase 
in the discount rate attracted in the first place capital flows and gold from abroad, thus 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on a Laurea Dissertation presented on July 7, 1997 by Cristina Francucci at the Università 
di Brescia entitled “Gli obiettivi della politica monetaria tedesca durante il tallone aureo: 1876-1914. Un’analisi 
econometrica delle determinanati del tasso di sconto della Reichsbank” and written under the supervision of the 
first author. We thank Hannah Nielsen for research assistance. 
 
2At that time the Reichsbank was also operating as a commercial bank. 
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contributing to increase the Central Bank’s gold stock. It also reduced the demand for 
rediscounting at the Bank and the level of economic activity in the country, thus reducing the 
stock of banknotes outstanding. Hence both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio 
would move in the right direction. The analysis of the determinants of the liquidity ratio is 
therefore crucial to understand the objectives of monetary policy during the classical gold 
standard to the extent that its changes caused changes in the discount rate and changes in the 
discount rate were the main instrument to control the liquidity ratio. 
 The determinants of the Reichsbank’s liquidity ratio have already been studied by 
Sommariva and Tullio (1987), using a data set consisting of 136 observations referring to the 
136 discount rate changes enacted during the period. However, while their study included 
only one explanatory variable, the differential between the private discount rate in Berlin and 
the official discount rate of the Reichsbank (henceforth called “the differential”), we include 
in this paper also foreign discount rate changes and the deviations of the Reichsmark from 
gold parity recorded in the other main financial centres. 
 The inclusion of foreign variables into the model allows us to analyse to what extent 
German financial markets and the Reichsbank’s liquidity ratio were influenced by financial 
conditions abroad, which were the most important gold standard countries influencing 
Germany, the degree of international financial market integration at that time and whether it 
changed significantly from 1876 to 1913. Finally, the inclusion of foreign variables allows us 
to test if there were periods during which the use of gold devices3 by the Reichsbank and/or 
other gold standard Central Banks significantly changed the coefficients of the estimated 
relationships. 
 The study of the determinants of the Reichsbank’s liquidity ratio with the inclusion of 
foreign explanatory variables is not only important for the reasons stated above, it is also 
crucial to understand the factors which led to discount rate changes and hence which were the 
main objectives of monetary policy.  
 Changes in the discount rate were the most important instrument of monetary policy 
during the classical gold standard. A second instrument was the changes in the criteria for 
admission to rediscounting by commercial banks and of borrowing by the non-banking 
private sector, which at that time had also access to Central Bank credit. The third instrument 
was the so-called gold devices which changed the conditions of gold shipments abroad and 
                                                          
3 Gold devices were used by Central Banks to avoid sales and exports of gold and/or to make these operations 
more costly to the private sector.  They consisted in raising the sales price of gold, moving the delivery of gold 
to places distant from the border, delivering minted national coins instead of ingots, and increase the interest 
rates on lending to gold exporters in order to increase transaction costs. 
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hence the width of the band around the gold parity within which the market exchange 
fluctuated.  
 For the period from 1880 to 1913 Bloomfield (1959) showed graphically that there was 
an inverse correlation between annual discount rates and the liquidity ratio for a large number 
of gold standard Central Banks. Goodhart (1972) used a more sophisticated approach to study 
the link between the official discount rate of the Bank of England and her liquidity ratio. 
Finally Sommariva and Tullio (1987) analysed the factors which influenced the Reichsbanks’ 
decisions to change the official discount rate from 1876 to 1913 using data which refer to 
each discount rate change enacted by the Reichsbank. These data are contained in a rather 
rare volume published in 1925 in Berlin by the German Imperial Printing Office and entitled 
“Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik” (1925) (henceforth: VN). The data cover four gold 
standard countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Austria-Hungary), they are 
collected using the same criteria for all four countries and contain, besides discount rates and 
liquidity ratios, also data on exchange rates and private (commercial bank’s) discount rates. 
 Sommariva and Tullio (1987) concluded in their study that the differential, a measure of 
the “tension” on the Reichsbank’s gold stock, is a very significant determinant of the liquidity 
ratio. They show that the effect is negative and offer explanations of why this should be so. 
Finally they show that there were significant differences in the effect of the liquidity ratio on 
the Reichsbank’s discount rate and of the differential on the liquidity ratio between the sub-
period 1876-1895 and the sub-period 1896-1913.  
 Following Sommariva and Tullio (1987) we use in this paper the data from VN. Their 
main advantages are that they are available for the whole period from the day the Reichsbank 
started operations on January 1st 1876 to 1913 and since we have the same data set for four 
gold standard countries meaningful international comparisons are possible. In this paper we 
also present stability tests of the estimated regressions to gain insights into how the working 
of the gold standard changed during this 38 year period. 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the model explaining the 
Reichsbank’s liquidity ratio taking into account international influences. Section 2 describes 
in detail the data used and how the variables have been constructed. Section 3 presents the 
estimates of the model for the whole period and for the two sub-periods 1876-1895 and 1896-





1.  The model 
In this section we present an equation explaining the changes in the Reichsbank’s 
liquidity ratio. Following Sommariva and Tullio (1987), it is assumed that changes in the 
liquidity ratio depend on the differential between the private and the official discount rate in 
Berlin. However, in order to test how the degree of international financial market integration 
changed through time and to verify the assumption of bi-polarity or multi-polarity of the 
classical gold standard, a set of variables capturing international influences, market exchange 
rates and foreign official discount rates, was included among the explanatory variables. 
Thus the equation to be estimated is: 
 




P21i ++∆+−+=∆ ∑∑ , 
 
where il∆  denotes a change in the liquidity ratio of the Reichsbank. We shall use a 
narrow )1i( =  and a broad definition )2i( = . The first is the ratio of the gold and silver stock 
to banknotes issued by the Reichsbank )l( 1 , and the second has the same numerator but 
includes in the denominator sight liabilities in addition to banknotes issued )l( 2 . ∆ stands for 
a change of the variable. In this case ∆ does not denote the usual difference operator, since in 
our data set the changes refer to differently spaced time points. The residuals are denoted by  
u. 
D
P ii −  denotes the differential between the average private discount rate in Berlin and the 
Reichsbank’s discount rate. The superscript  D  stands for Germany. 
ji∆  denotes changes in discount rate of country j, where the superscript Ej =  stands for 





j e/)ee(w −=  denotes the percentage deviation of the market exchange rate of the 
Reichsmark with the currency of country  j with respect to the gold parity; the asterisk 
indicates the gold parity and the variable “ej” the market exchange rate. The gold parity never 
changed during the whole period for Germany, France and Great Britain. 
 Equation (1) states that the main domestic determinant of changes in the liquidity ratio 
is the differential which reflects the situation of the domestic business cycle and the liquidity 
position of the German and in particular the Berlin financial market. The differential must 
have had very high informative contents for the markets and the monetary authorities. An 
increase in the differential put the Reichsbank under strain as it increased the demand for 
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rediscounting on the part of commercial banks and it increased the demand for notes, gold 
and Central Bank credit by the private sector. The channels between the business cycle and 
the liquidity ratio or its components have been studied by Goodhart (1972) for the United 
Kingdom and McGouldrick (1984) and Sommariva and Tullio (1987) for Germany. 
Unfortunately we cannot introduce the business cycle into this model because we have no 
data on industrial production and GDP comparable to those of VN.  
 In addition to the differential, changes in the liquidity ratio are assumed to be influenced 
by foreign discount rate changes and deviations of market exchanges rates from the gold 
parity.  
The expected signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are: negative for the 
differential, negative for changes in foreign official discount rates and negative for the 
deviation of the exchange rate from the gold parity. The exchange rate is defined as the 
number of domestic currency units for one unit of foreign currency (Pound, French Franc and 
Austrian Florin/Krone); hence an increase in ej indicates a devaluation of the Reichsmark 
(capital and gold outflows from Germany). 
For the exact definition of the variables and for the time span to which their changes 
refer see Section 2. Suffice to mention here that the series used are not equidistant time series 
but they refer to timely ordered episodes of all official discount rate changes which occurred 
during the period. From 1876 to 1913 the Reichsbank changed the official discount rate 136 
times.  
Changes in foreign discount rates are measured over an interval similar to the one 
chosen by the compilers of the tables of VN to measure changes in liquidity ratios. The exact 
definition of the intervals over which changes in the foreign discount rates are measured is 
also discussed in Section 2. 
 
 
2. Description of the data used for estimation 
 The data from VN used in this paper are obtained from a 1925 volume, entitled 
“Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und Geschäftsverkehr Europäischer Noten-
banken, 1876-1913”. This two-volume publication contains monthly and annual financial 
data for seven European countries: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, 
the United Kingdom and Russia. For four countries: France, Germany, the United Kingdom 
and Austria-Hungary there are more detailed tables containing a wealth of data relating to 
each official discount rate change. For Germany the relevant table is Table 133 (pages 240 to 
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246 of Vol. 2). In order to facilitate the description of the data we reproduce in Table 1 below 
the columns of Table 133 used in the empirical work together with the data for a limited 
number of discount rate changes. 
 The one and a half page long introduction to this set of tables contains the following 
sentence: “These tables represent an attempt to explain with a purely numerical methodology 
those factors taken into consideration in deciding changes in the discount rate at the time the 
changes were enacted. These factors were the balance sheet of the Central Bank on the days 
prior to the change, confronted with another balance sheet chosen on purpose by the 
compilers of the table (italic our addition), the foreign exchanges and some foreign discount 
rates” (VN, page 238). This sentence and the data description which follows go a long way in 
explaining what the German compilers were aiming at. They certainly knew very well, long 
before these concepts became current, what a reaction or an objective function of a Central 
Bank is. 
 The first column contains the month, day, and year of the official discount rate change. 
The second column contains the date of the closest statement of the Reichsbank used by the 
compilers of the table, and possibly also by the members of the Board at the meeting during 
which the discount rate change was decided4, to analyse the factors which led to the decision 
to change the discount rate. The date of the closest statement generally precedes the day of 
the discount rate change by one to seven days. In 7 cases the date of the closest statement 
coincides with the day of the discount rate change and in 22 cases it follows it by 1 to 3 days. 
The third column contains the date of a more distant statement, preceding the date of the 
closest one by a minimum of 1 week to a maximum of 1 year. The interval between the two 
statements was chosen by the compilers of the table. In choosing these reference intervals the 
compilers were interested in eliminating disturbances to the balance sheet items of the Bank 
caused by seasonal factors or special events. For the whole period the average interval 




                                                          
4This is our supposition.  
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Table 1: Discount rate changes of the  Reichsbank, 1876 – 1913. Some representative data at the beginning of the period. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 











1l∆  2l∆  DP ii −  Ee  Fe  Ei∆  Fi∆  Ai∆  
1 1/3/1876 1/1/1876 11/23/1875 -8,7 -5,8 0,5 20,30 80,85 0,0 0,0 0,0 
2 1/19/1876 1/15/1876 1/1/1876 4,9 0,5 -1,625 20,32 80,90 1,0 0,0 0,0 
3 2/4/1876 1/31/1876 1/1/1876 9,1 3,3 -2,0 20,395 81,15 0,0 0,0 -0,5 
4 5/18/1876 5/15/1876 1/31/1876 14,2 6,8 -1,125 20,40 80,95 -2,0 0,0 0,0 
5 7/11/1876 7/7/1876 5/31/1876 -14,7 -7,7 -0,5 20,51 80,95 0,0 0,0 0,0 
6 10/25/1876 10/23/1876 5/31/1876 -17,6 -8,8 -0,375 20,42 81,20 0,0 0,0 0,0 
7 1/5/1877 1/7/1877 12/31/1876 1,0 1,1 -1,25 20,40 81,15 0,0 0,0 0,0 
8 5/11/1877 5/7/1877 2/7/1877 -1,2 -0,2 -0,875 20,475 81,49 1,0 -1,0 0,0 
9 6/16/1877 6/15/1877 5/15/1877 3,2 2,4 -1,75 20,475 81,15 0,0 0,0 0,0 
10 9/12/1877 9/7/1877 8/23/1877 -7,8 -3,8 -0,75 20,47 81,40 1,0 0,0 0,0 
11 10/3/1877 9/30/1877 9/7/1877 -8,8 -5,6 -0,375 20,43 81,25 0,0 0,0 0,0 
12 11/12/1877 11/7/1877 10/7/1877 4,7 3,1 -1,125 20,45 81,25 1,0 0,0 0,0 
13 12/3/1877 11/30/1877 11/7/1877 4,6 0,8 -1,125 20,425 81,20 -1,0 0,0 0,0 
 
 
Source: Table 133 of VN 
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the sub-period 1876-1895 to 118.5 days in the sub-period 1896-19135. 
 Columns 4 and 5 contain the changes in the narrow and broad definition of the liquidity 
ratio between the two dates reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1. 1l  is defined as the ratio 
of the gold and silver stock of the Reichsbank to its banknotes outstanding. 2l  is defined as 
the ratio of the gold and silver stock of the Reichsbank and the sum of banknotes plus sight 
liabilities issued  by the Reichsbank. 
 Column 6 contains the differential between the average private discount rate of major 
commercial banks in Berlin and the official discount rate of the Reichsbank on the day prior 
to the discount rate change. It is worth mentioning that in VN this differential is called “the 
tension” (Spannung in German).  
 Columns 7 and 8 contain exchange rates on the day before the discount rate change. 
Column 7 reports the number of Reichsmark per Pound in London and column 8 the number 
of Reichsmark per 100 French Francs in Paris. In order to obtain the percentage deviations of 
the market exchange rates from gold parity, we used the gold parities reported in Gallarotti 
(1995). They are: 20.430 Reichsmark per Pound and 80.99 Reichsmark per 100 French 
Franc. For Austria-Hungary the exchange rate of the Reichsmark in Vienna is not available 
for the whole period. 
 Changes in the official discount rates in Great Britain )i( E∆ , France )i( F∆  and 
Austria-Hungary )i( A∆  are not reported in Table 133 of VN. For their construction we had 
to use information contained in the other tables of VN. As for these three foreign countries, 
VN contains daily figures of the official discount rates for the whole period 1876-1913, we 
calculated for each of the 136 episodes of changes in the Reichsbank’s discount rate the 
corresponding changes in the three foreign official discount rates. The changes are calculated 
over the interval between the date reported in column 3 of Table 1 and the day before the 
discount rate change.  
 To summarize five observations are in order. First, the data presented in Table 1 and 
derived from Table 133 of VN can be divided into four main categories: A. For each discount 
rate change information on the balance sheet items of the Reichsbank, in other words on its 
assets and liabilities, on two reference days which usually both precede the discount rate 
change (only in 29 out of 136 cases the end date is later than the discount rate change). B. 
                                                          
5The significant (about threefold) increase in the reference interval observed from the first to the second sub-
period may be an indication that the Reichsbank was taking a longer run view of economic developments and 
that it was more relaxed than before, sitting on a higher and increasing gold stock. This large increase observed 
for the Reichsbank stands in sharp contrast with the significant reduction observed for the Bank of England. See 
Tullio and Wolters (2003b). 
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The differential between the private discount rate of major commercial banks in Berlin and 
the discount rate of the Reichsbank on the day prior to the discount rate change. C.  The 
market exchange rates with reference to two main foreign currencies on the day preceding 
the change in the discount rate. D. The changes in the foreign discount rates measured over 
the interval between the date indicated in column 3 and the day prior to the discount rate 
change in Germany. 
 Second, the series contained in each column are not equally spaced chronologically 
ordered data; hence the frequency of the data is variable, depending on the time elapsed 
between one discount rate change and the next. Third, there is virtually no degree of 
discretion on our part in the way the series were constructed. How the variables are 
constructed follows logically from a careful analysis of Table 133 in VN.  
 Fourth, the compilers of the table were not just statisticians, they were economic 
historians writing a history of the gold standard in numbers. We presume that they must have 
had substantial inside information on how decisions were taken and on how the system was 
actually working. They may have written the book with some degree of longing for stability 
in international monetary matters which in 1925 was nowhere near in sight. They may have 
written it with the same spirit which guided Egyptian scholars in the third and second 
centuries BC to write down as much as they could about a disappearing culture6. Fifth, it is 
clear that the use of annual data, as for example in Bloomfield (1959), hides a substantial 
amount of information and therefore their use would bias all coefficients towards zero. This 
may hold also for monthly data, albeit to a much smaller degree. 
By estimating equation (1) with the data presented in this section we make use of an 
incredible wealth of information which has been hardly exploited so far.7  
 
 
3. The determinants of changes in the Reichsbank’s liquidity ratios 
In this section we present ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) which 
includes exchange rates and foreign discount rates among the explanatory variables. We 
started out with all explanatory variables in the regression and then eliminated successively 
all non significant ones. The program used was Eviews 4.0.  Table 2 contains the estimates 
for the narrowly defined liquidity ratio )l( 1∆  for the whole period and for the sub-periods 
1876-1895 and 1896-1913. The estimates for the broadly defined liquidity ratio )l( 2∆  are 
                                                          
6Most of the written Egyptian documents concerning the Egyptian culture date from these last centuries. 
7 Exceptions are Sommaria and Tullio (1987) and Tullio and Wolters (2003°, 2003b and 2004) 
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presented in Table 3. The important role played by the differential has been already explained 
in Section 1. The key role played by this variable is strongly confirmed by the regression 
results. As to foreign variables, only the Bank of England’s discount rate was significant. 
 





(T = 136) 
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(T = 66) 
1896-1913 
(T = 70) 
 (1) (2) (3) 



















2R  0.575 0.590 0.610 
DW 1.84 1.90 1.82 
AIC 7.714 7.228 7.953 


























Absolute values of the t-statistics are given in parantheses, p-values in brackets.  DW denotes 
the Durbin-Watson statistic.  Q(10) denotes the Box-Pierce Portmanteau statistic with 10 lags 
to test for white noise in the residuals.  HET is the White test for heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals.  The RESET test tests against specification errors.  The Akaike (Schwarz) informa-
tion criterium is denoted as AIC (SC).  
 
Starting with the results for the whole period, the coefficients of both explanatory 
variables have the expected signs and are significantly different from zero at the 1% 
confidence level. In particular an increase in the differential of 100 basis points led to a fall of 
13.6 percentage points in the first liquidity ratio and 7.4 in the second, and an increase in the 
Bank of England’s discount rate of 100 basis points led to a fall of 4.3 percentage points in 
the first liquidity ratio and of 2.4 in the second8. The fraction of the variance explained is 59% 
                                                          
8 A few words are in order concerning the days on which the compilers of VN reported the tension and the final 
day of the period over which the changes in the liquidity ratio are measured (reference period). In 98 out of 136 
cases the tension is measured one to 6 days after the end of the reference period.  For regressions with time 
series the explanatory variables should normally not be measured at a date later than the date of the dependent 
variable. We do not think that this constitutes a problem in our case mainly because the differential measures the 
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for the second. Thus, while the influence of domestic factors, as reflected by the differential, 
dominates over foreign ones, foreign influences cannot be neglected: they are very significant 
and lead to a noticeable improvement in the explanatory power of the regressions9.  
 





(T = 136) 
1876-1895 
(T = 66) 
1896-1913 
(T = 70) 
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2R  0.589 0.606 0.645 
DW 1.89 2.02 1.86 
AIC 6.468 5.833 6.706 


























Notes:  see Table 2 
 
 The residuals are well behaved: they are not autocorrelated, not heteroskedastic, and 
normally distributed. The regressions do not present signs of functional form 
misspecification. However, according to the Cusum of Squares test none of the regressions is 
stable at the 5% confidence level (see Figures 1 and 2). The recursive parameter estimates, 
also shown in Figures 1 and 2, indicate that the main reason for the instability is the 
significant increase in the absolute value of the coefficient of the differential from the first to 
the second period. The coefficient of changes in the Bank of England’s discount rate remains 
instead more stable. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
accumulation of tensions over a time span which may be as long as or even longer than the reference interval. In 
addition if the reference period is on average over two months long, a few days’ lead of the differential should 
not matter. 
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Figure 2: Recursive coefficients and CUSUM of Squares test for equation (1) of Table 3
 
 In line with these findings, we performed Chow break F tests for both regressions in 
order to verify whether and when a structural break occurred. The lowest p-values of the 
statistic (p = 0.002) are observed at or just before observation 66, which corresponds to the 
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last discount rate change of 1895. After observation 66 the p-values increase sharply. Since 
the lowest p-values are associated with the highest probability of a structural break, we 
conclude that a break occurred at observation 66. As a result the period is split into two, the 
first period going from 1876 to 1895 (observations 1-66) and the second going from 1896 to 
1913 (observations 67-136).  
 There are also many other reasons for choosing 1895 as a turning point in the history of 
the classical gold standard. Among them should be mentioned the end of the long period of 
declining prices in connection with the discovery of new gold mines and of a new process to 
extract gold. In addition in the second sub-period communication and transportation 
techniques were more developed, thus affecting the degree of international financial market 
integration. Furthermore in the early 1890s ended a period characterized by a more intensive 
use of gold devices on the part of most gold standard Central Banks, including the Bank of 
England, which was historically more averse to the use of such devices. The use of gold 
devices reduced the degree of international financial integration among countries10. Finally 
the relative economic and financial weight of Germany increased substantially and the Pound 
developed into an international reserve currency. Certainly, all these changes did not occur 
abruptly on December 31st, 1895. However, this date represents a justifiable dividing line 
between an earlier and a later phase of the classical gold standard.  
 The regressions for these two sub-periods are also presented in Table 2 for 1l∆  and in 
Table 3 for 2l∆ . The coefficient of the differential shows a significant increase in absolute 
value for both liquidity ratios. This increase may simply be the result of the higher average 
gold stock in the second period and/or of the large increase from 35.4 days to 118.5 days in 
the average reference interval over which 1l∆  and 2l∆  are measured. More interesting is the 
reduction in the significance of the coefficient of Ei∆  in the second period. This may be an 
indication of a somewhat reduced role of the London financial market in determining events 
in Germany and it may imply that the effect of increased economic weight of Germany and of 
its increased gold stock outweighed the effect of increased financial market integration. But it 
may also mean that in the second period London influenced Berlin more indirectly via the 
Berlin differential. The hypothesis that the effects of Ei∆  on the Berlin differential became 
stronger in the second period could be tested with the data at our disposal but this is left for 
future work.  
                                                          
10 For instance Tullio and Wolters (2004) find evidence of a signficantly reduced effect of the Berlin discount 
rate on London’s narrow liquidity ratio from the end of 1885 to the end of 1893.   
 15
 The residuals are well behaved and there is no indication of functional form 
misspecification. The stability tests for both periods are shown in Figure 3 for 1l∆  and in 
Figure 4 for 2l∆ . The figures show that by splitting the period all regressions and coefficients 
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Figure 3: CUSUM of Squares test for regressions (2) and (3) of Table 2
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Figure 4: CUSUM of Squares test for regressions (2) and (3) of Table 3




4. Summary of main results and conclusions 
 In this paper we present OLS estimates of an equation explaining changes in the 
Reichsbank’s liquidity ratios from 1876, when it started operations, to 1913. The changes in  
the liquidity ratios are assumed to depend on the differential between the private and the 
official discount rate in Berlin, on foreign discount rates and on deviations of exchange rates 
of the Reichsmark from gold parity. Two liquidity ratios are used in this paper, a narrow and a 
broad one. It does not make much difference in estimating the model whether the narrow or 
the broad definition of the liquidity ratio is used. 
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 A number of observations are in order. We use data referring to all episodes of discount 
rate changes enacted by the Reichsbank during the period. Since there were 136 such changes 
we have 136 observations. The use of these data reduces the problem of reverse causation 
between exogenous and endogenous variables, contrary to annual or monthly data which hide 
a substantial amount of information, given the frequent changes in the discount rate and the 
large and rapid changes in the liquidity ratios. We introduce international factors into the 
model: changes in foreign discount rates and deviations of exchange rates from gold parity. 
The introduction of foreign variables allows the study of mutual financial influences among 
countries. We present stability tests and split the sample period in order to analyse the 
changes in the role of the determinants of the liquidity ratios and in the working of the gold 
standard over time. 
 The main findings of the paper are first that throughout the period the differential 
between the private discount rate in Berlin and the official one played an important role in 
transmitting disturbances from the real economy, from the German financial market and from 
London to the Reichsbank’s liquidity ratios. 
 Second, the only foreign country among the three considered in this paper (Great 
Britain, France and Austria-Hungary) which systematically and significantly influenced both 
liquidity ratios of the Reichsbank was Great Britain. In both periods the Bank of England’s 
discount rate exerted a significant influence on the Reichsbank liquidity ratios. Instead the 
deviations of the Pound-Reichsmark exchange rate from parity were not significant. The 
effect of the Bank of England's discount rate on the Reichsbank’s liquidity ratios became 
somewhat less significant in the second period.  
 Third, the finding of this paper that London significantly influenced Berlin coupled with 
the findings (Tullio and Wolters 2003b, 2004) that Berlin significantly influenced London,  
imply that the classical gold standard was a decentralized multi-polar system (or at least a bi-
polar one) as suggested by Eichengreen (1992) and Tullio and Wolters (1996, 2000), rather 
than the system which Keynes(1930) is alleged to have had in mind in his well known 
“conductor of the orchestra” view. 
 Fourth, the relationships estimated for the whole period are unstable. The instability 
results mainly from a significant change in the coefficient of the differential from the first to 
the second period. This may be the result of a more important role played by the differential 
in the second period in transmitting financial market disturbances, including international 
ones, to the Reichsbank’s balance sheet, but it may also much more simply be the result of the 
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increased average gold stock and/or of a large increase in the reference interval over which 
1l∆  and 2l∆  are measured. 
 Fifth, even though the change in the coefficient of the differential does not occur 
abruptly, a Chow break test indicates that the most appropriate time to split the period in two 
is at the end of 1895. We then test all regressions separately for the sub-periods 1876-1895 
and 1896-1913 and find that all regressions become stable. The improvement is more marked 
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